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JURISPRUDENTIAL TIES THAT BLIND: THE MEANS TO END AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION

Tanya Washington*
INTRODUCTION
For the past twenty-five years, policies and practices designed to address
obstacles to educational opportunities, resulting from this nation’s rich history of racial
discrimination, have been losing popular appeal and legal ground.1 The promise of equal
educational opportunity as a protected civil right that grounded the decision in Brown v.
Board of Education 2 has been encumbered by subsequent holdings that frustrate and
foreclose its realization.3 In its 2013 decision in Fisher v. Texas,4 the Supreme Court
established a more exacting constitutional test for race conscious admissions practices,
signaling the Court’s abdication of its role in promoting and securing the promise of

*
Associate Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law; J.D., University of Maryland School of Law; LLM, Harvard
University Law School. This essay was presented at the Harvard Journal on Racial and Ethnic Justice Spring 2014 Conference: “40
Years After Milliken: Remedying Racial Disparities in a ‘Post-Racial’ Society.” The author is indebted to Tatiana Lima, Jason
Carruthers and Matthew Johnson for their excellent research assistance and to the editors of the Harvard Journal on Race and Ethnic
Justice for hosting an amazing conference and for their thorough editing of the essay. She is incredibly grateful to Professors Derek
Alphran, Carlton Waterhouse, Dr. Laura McNeal, Taunya Banks, Christine Gallant and Dr. Vasco Smith for providing insightful
comments on earlier drafts of the essay. Finally, the author expresses gratitude to her mother, Cynthia G. Williams, who instilled in
her the wisdom that equality is not divisible; either it exists for all or not at all.
1
Casey S. McKay, Recent Decision: Fishin' with Fisher: Determining the Depth of Deference Does Not Demand Damning Deference
to a Dastardly Death, 83 MISS. L.J. 951, 968 (2014) (“While the principles, guidelines, and boundaries concerning a courts
application of strict scrutiny and deference were seemingly well defined after Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz, Justice Kennedy's recent
narrow interpretation of deference—which both adds unprecedented substance to the analysis and completely ignores many important
aspects of a university's judgment—may prove fatal to both deference and race-based affirmative action plans.”); Sonu Bedi,
Collapsing Suspect Class with Suspect Classification: Why Strict Scrutiny is Too Strict and Maybe Not Strict Enough, 47 GA. L. REV.
301, 317 (2013) (“[R]ace-based affirmative action likely will not be upheld. Again, consider that from 1990 to 2003, federal courts
invalidated 73% of all democratically enacted laws discriminating on the basis of race.”); Robert A. Parrish, How Quickly We Forget:
The Short and Undistinguished Career of Affirmative Action, 65 S.C. L. REV. 503, 503 (2013) (“Affirmative action initiatives have
been under attack since their very inception, and they now sit teetering on the brink of being declared unconstitutional after the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin.”).
2
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3
Goodwin Liu, Brown, Bollinger, and Beyond, 47 HOW. L.J. 705, 708 (2004) (“Underlying the doctrinal shift, I argue, are three
currents that run through the Court's retreat from Brown: impatience with remedial intervention, skepticism toward the ability of
schools to affect individuals and society, and indifference to the social context in which education's purpose and importance are
embedded. These currents not only depart from Brown, but also form an unlikely backdrop for the Court's opinion in Grutter.”); Brad
Snyder, How the Conservatives Canonized Brown v. Board of Education, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 383, 483 (2000) (“Thomas's critique of
affirmative action turned Brown's ‘feeling of inferiority’ language on its head by recalling the language of Plessy: ‘These programs
stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop dependencies or to adopt an attitude that they are
“entitled” to preferences.’ Although neither Thomas nor Scalia specifically cited Harlan's dissent in Plessy, the Court's two leading
originalists are trying to recast Brown and the Fourteenth Amendment according to Harlan's supposedly color-blind vision.”).
4
Fisher v. Univ. Texas at Austin, 133 S.Ct. 2411 (2013).
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substantive equality that animates the Equal Protection Clause. 5 Its 2014 decision in
Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action 6 offers a tacit invitation to state
electorates to vote to prohibit race-conscious state action that promotes racially diverse
educational environments. Given the temper of the times, it is an invitation that is likely
to be accepted en masse.7
This dismal backdrop and affirmative action’s indeterminate future was the
subject of a conference at Harvard Law School, convened by the Harvard Journal on
Racial and Ethnic Justice in the spring of 2014. This essay, developed from a talk
delivered at the conference, highlights how the Supreme Court’s equal protection
jurisprudence predestines the use of race for constitutional invalidation. In light of this
reality, the piece questions the capacity of affirmative action efforts to ensure educational
equity and racial diversity. Beginning with the Court’s determination of the limited
purpose and power of the Equal Protection Clause in Plessy v. Ferguson, 8 the essay
examines several jurisprudential inversions the Supreme Court has deliberately devised
and drawn upon to recast the central covenant of the Equal Protection Clause as racial
neutrality, rather than racial equality. The essay concludes that this reading of the Clause
renders affirmative action efforts largely rhetorical.
5

The race conscious program in Fisher sought to produce racial diversity and is therefore distinguishable from race conscious efforts
focused on remediation, integration and desegregation. See Tanya Washington, The Diversity Dichotomoy: The Supreme Court’s
Reticence to Give Race A Capital “R”, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 977 (PIN CITE) (2004) (criticizing the majority in Grutter for failing to
adequately distinguish remedial affirmative action from racial diversity in light of their distinct aims, purposes and animating
principles.). Despite their differences, however, racial diversity, which requires a critical mass of students of color, shares with
remedial affirmative action a preoccupation with inclusion as a constituent aspect of educational equality. See Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306, 331–332 (2003) (“This Court has long recognized that ‘education . . . is the very foundation of good citizenship (citation
omitted).’ For this reason, the diffusion of knowledge and opportunity through public institutions of higher education must be
accessible to all individuals regardless of race or ethnicity . . . Effective participation by all members of all racial and ethnic groups in
the civic life of our Nation is essential if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized . . . All members of our heterogeneous
society must have confidence in openness and integrity of the educational institutions that provide this [leadership] training.”).
6
Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
7
David G. Savage, Supreme Court Upholds Michigan Ban on Affirmative Action, L.A.TIMES, (Apr. 22, 2014),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-court-affirmative-action-20140423-story.html#page=1, archived at http://perma.cc/7YW8AQVU; Puneet Kollipara, The Supreme Court Deals a Blow to Affirmative Action, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Apr. 23, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/04/23/wonkbook-the-supreme-court-deals-a-blow-to-affirmative-action,
archived at http://perma.cc/73BG-63JG.
8
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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Part I of the essay analyzes the Court’s narrow definition of the kind of equality
that falls within the authority of the Equal Protection Clause to address, remediate and
secure. This section addresses the Court’s imprecise distinction between societal and
legal discrimination in Plessy and considers how the Court’s reliance on it in subsequent
cases places injurious forms of discrimination beyond the constitutional reach of
remedial, race-conscious state action authorized by the Fourteenth Amendment.9 This
borderless distinction informs the Court’s determination that the constitutional use of race
for remedial purposes is limited to targeting de jure discrimination, not de facto
discrimination, without acknowledging the latter as a natural and inevitable consequence
of the former. 10 Part II of the essay examines the origins of the dubious distinction
between de jure and de facto discrimination and its adverse impact on state efforts to
remediate the harms caused by racial discrimination and to achieve educational equity.11
The focus of Part III is on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Fisher that
further tapers the strict scrutiny test making it exceedingly challenging for any use of race
to clear constitutional hurdles.12 In view of the Court’s reading of the Equal Protection
Clause, in Fisher, as codifying racial neutrality rather than racial equality, Part IV
considers the prospects and wisdom of using several proposed race-neutral measures
designed to achieve educational equity and racial diversity.13 The essay’s conclusion
forecasts the categorical prohibition of the consideration of race as an inevitable
consequence of the Court’s contemporary equal protection jurisprudence. And, in light
of the one step forward, two steps back advance of affirmative action efforts, it suggests

9

See discussion infra Part I.
See discussion infra Part II.
11
See discussion infra Part II.
12
See discussion infra Part III.
13
See discussion infra Part IV.
10

3

the need for a new approach to achieving racial diversity and substantive educational
equality.14
I. AN ENDURING DIVIDE: DISCRIMINATING BETWEEN DISCRIMINATION
The Thirteenth,

15

Fourteenth

16

and Fifteenth

17

Amendments comprise a

constitutional trinity, which in the aggregate were intended to cure the deprivations
inherent in the institution of slavery that persisted in America for more than three
hundred years.18 Hindsight confirms that the constitutional provisions were insufficient
to eviscerate pervasive racial discrimination in slavery’s wake. Though the protections
and freedoms they were devised to secure may have enjoyed some success,19 in many
respects they have fallen short of achieving their intended aims.20 Among the Civil War

14
Professor Robin West provides a lucid explanation of the difference between formal and substantive equality, as defined within the
context of equal protection. She instructs,

Modern courts and commentators have identified two dramatically different meanings the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment might have: a substantive meaning (or “substantive equality”) and a formal
meaning (or “formal equality”). The formal meaning of equality, or of “equal protection,” is that legislators
must treat like groups alike, and the laws they make must reflect this mandate by being “rational (citation
omitted).” Thus, if two groups are alike in some relevant respect, a law may not prescribe different treatment of
them. Put somewhat differently, to meet the formal criterion of equality, the distinctions a law creates must be
rationally related not only to a legitimate end but also to preexisting differences between the affected groups. If
a law fails to meet this standard, then the state has denied “equal protection of the law.” The substantive
meaning of equality, or of equal protection, is that legislators must use law to insure that no social group, such
as whites or men, wrongfully subordinates another social group, such as blacks or women (citation omitted).
Thus, if one group wrongfully dominates another -- whether economically, physically, socially or sexually -then the legislature must at least attempt to use legal means to bring an end to that wrongful relation of
domination and subordination. For a state to fail to do so is to “deny” the subordinated group “equal protection
of the law.”
Robin West, Symposium on Statutory Interpretation: The Meaning of Equality and the Interpretive Turn, 66 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 451,
469–70 (1990).
15
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
16
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
17
U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
18
See generally Carlton Waterhouse, Avoiding Another Step in a Series of Unfortunate Legal Events: A Consideration of Black Life
Under American Law From 1619 To 1972 and a Challenge to Prevailing Notions of Legally Based Reparations, 26 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 207, 226 (2006).
19
See generally Mary E. Maatman, Speaking Truth to Memory: Lawyers and Resistance to the End of White Supremacy, 50 HOW. L.J.
1, 17 (2006); Meredith L. Bryant, Combating School Resegregation through Housing: A Need for a Reconceptualization of American
Democracy and the Rights it Protects, 13 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 127 (1997).
20
The mass incarceration of black men and boys; arrest, conviction and sentencing disparities; racial profiling and the proliferation of
disenfranchisement laws provide compelling examples of the failures of the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished involuntary
servitude, and the Fifteenth Amendment, which guaranteed the right to vote. See Michael D. Shear, Obama Starts Initiative for Young
Black Men, Noting His Own Experience, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/28/us/politics/obama-willannounce-initiative-to-empower-young-black-men.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/CKM2-WNRK (“He called the challenge of
ensuring success for young men of color a ‘moral issue for our country’ as he ticked off the statistics: black boys who are more likely
to be suspended from school, less likely to be able to read, and almost certain to encounter the criminal justice system as either a
perpetrator or a victim.”); Genevieve Saul, A Perfect Storm: The Negative Effects of Felony Voting Laws and the Repeal of Section 4
of the Voting Rights Act on Minority Americans, 9 Mod. Am. 35 (2014); Ian F. Haney López, Post-Racial Racism: Racial

4

Amendments designed to guarantee equality for those newly inducted into American
citizenship, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment21 protects against
the discriminatory infringement of specified rights, and targets the limited category of
state licensed inequality. 22

The Equal Protection Clause (“Clause”) controls the

constitutional analysis of legislation that draws classifications based on race.
The Slaughter-House Cases23 afforded the Supreme Court its first opportunity to
address the proper construction of the Equal Protection Clause; however, the decision
neither addressed race nor specified the rights the Clause was intended to secure. 24
Twenty-three years later, in Plessy v. Ferguson, the Court was presented with a dispute
centered squarely on race, and it defined the substantive scope of the Clause and the
rights falling within its protective sphere. 25

The central issue in Plessy was the

constitutionality of a Louisiana law that required that all railway passenger cars be
segregated by race. The plaintiff challenged the statute as contravening Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendment protections and rights, and he argued that his quantum of white
blood (seven-eighths) entitled him to ride in the carriage reserved for whites.26 The Court
did not resolve Plessy’s claim regarding his entitlement to the privileges secured by his

Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023 (2010); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM
CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010). This essay’s focus is the failure of the Fourteenth
Amendment to create or accommodate meaningful educational equity and racial diversity.
21
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
22
See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879) (explaining that the Equal Protection Clause was “designed to assure to the
colored race the enjoyment of all the civil rights that under the law are enjoyed by white persons, and to give to that race the protection
of the general government, in that enjoyment, whenever it should be denied by the States”).
23
83 U.S. 36 (1873) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment was primarily designed to protect former slaves from laws passed by
Congress, not to alter the police power of the state in relation to citizens of that state).
24
See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 543 (describing the Slaughterhouse cases as not “call[ing] for any expression of opinion as to the exact rights
it was intended to secure to the colored race, but it was said generally that its main purpose was to establish the citizenship of the
negro, to give definitions of citizenship of the United States and of the states, and to protect from the hostile legislation of the states
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as distinguished from those of citizens of the states.”).
25
See id. at 544.
26
Id. at 541–42. Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, noting the irony of the argument in light of the legacy of the case, observed, “He . . .
refused to admit that he was ‘in any sense or in any proportion a colored man.’” A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM:
RACIAL POLITICS AND PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 112 (1996) (citation omitted). For an in-depth analysis of
the power and privilege attendant to whiteness see Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1714 (1993)
(“After legalized segregation was overturned, whiteness as property evolved into a more modern form through the law's ratification of
the settled expectations of relative white privilege as a legitimate and natural baseline.”).
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“whiteness,” and it characterized racial identity as a question of fact to be determined
according to state law.27 The Court rejected Plessy’s Thirteenth Amendment argument,
having determined that the law did not “re-establish a state of involuntary servitude,”28
and it focused its analysis on whether the law offended the equality mandate at the heart
of the Equal Protection Clause.29
The Court divined a distinction between laws that infringe political rights and
promote political inequality and laws that legislate social inequality, according to whether
the enactment produces legal inferiority.30 Having determined that the Equal Protection
Clause affords no sanctuary for laws that facilitate political inequality, 31 the Court
explained that, “[a] statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the white
and colored races . . . has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two races . . .”
and lies beyond the provision’s protective reach.32 The Court’s description of the scope
and purpose of the Equal Protection Clause was shaped by its conclusion that the
constitutional provision could only address laws that infringe political rights. Justice
Brown, writing for the majority, explained:
The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute
equality of the two races before the law, but, in the nature of things, it
could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or
27
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552 (“It is true that the question of the proportion of colored blood necessary to constitute a colored person, as
distinguished from a white person, is one upon which there is a difference of opinion in the different states; some holding that any
visible admixture of black blood stamps the person as belonging to the colored race . . . . But these are questions to be determined
under the laws of each state, and are not properly put in issue in this case.”) (citations omitted).
28
Id. at 543. “That [the law] does not conflict with the thirteenth amendment, which abolished slavery and involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime, is too clear for argument. Slavery implies involuntary servitude—a state of bondage; the ownership
of mankind as a chattel, or, at least, the control of the labor and services of one man for the benefit of another, and the absence of a
legal right to the disposal of his own person, property, and services. . . . ‘It would be running the slavery question into the ground,’
said Mr. Justice Bradley [in the Civil Rights cases] ‘to make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to make
as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his concert or theater, or deal
with in other matters of intercourse or business.’” Id. at 542–43.
29
Id. at 542. The Court described the difference between the scope and purpose of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments,
explaining, “[The Thirteenth Amendment] was regarded by the statesmen of that day as insufficient to protect the colored race from
certain laws which had been enacted in the Southern states, imposing upon the colored race onerous disabilities and burdens, and
curtailing their rights in the pursuit of life, liberty, and property to such an extent that their freedom was of little value . . . .” Id.
However, the Court acknowledged the Fourteenth Amendment as having been “devised to meet this exigency.” Id.
30
Id. at 551–52.
31
See id. at 544.
32
Id. at 543.
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to enforce social, as distinguished from political, equality, or a
commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws
permitting, and even requiring, their separation, in places where they are
liable to be brought into contact, do not necessarily imply the inferiority of
either race to the other, and have been generally, if not universally,
recognized as within the competency of the state legislatures in the
exercise of their police power.33
The derisive doctrine of separate but equal was born.
The Court went on to reject Plessy’s argument that the discriminatory treatment
imposed by the challenged law infringed rights protected by the Equal Protection Clause,
and it explained the limitations on the kind of state-constructed inequality, against which
the Constitution could protect. Justice Brown explained:
The [plaintiff’s] argument . . . assumes that social prejudices may be
overcome by legislation . . . . Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial
instincts, or to abolish distinctions based upon physical differences . . . . If
the civil and political rights of both races be equal, one cannot be inferior
to the other civilly or politically. If one race be inferior to the other
socially, the constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the
same plane.34
The Court’s reasoning referenced the frequency with which it had drawn a
“distinction between laws interfering with the political equality of the negro and those
requiring the separation of the two races in schools, theatres, and railway carriages”;35
and the Court made clear that the Equal Protection Clause could address political
inequality, but was powerless to secure social equality or provide protection against statesanctioned social inequality.

The decision provided no substantive framework for

distinguishing between civil/political equality and social equality.

However, having

33

Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544 (emphasis added). The reference to a guarantee of “absolute equality” is contravened by the Court’s
determination that laws that authorize segregated schools were exempt from the protections provided by the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. (“[T]he establishment of separate schools for white and colored children . . . ha[s] been held to be a valid exercise of the legislative
power even by courts of states where the political rights of the colored race have been longest and most earnestly enforced.”). In a
similar vein, anti-miscegenation laws which the Court acknowledged “may be said in a technical sense to interfere with the freedom of
contract” were also considered to provide another example of racially discriminatory laws “universally recognized as within the police
power of the state.” Id. at 545 (citation omitted).
34
Id. at 551–52.
35
Id. at 545.
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divined a distinction that limited the power of the constitutional provision, the Court’s
determination that the right infringed by the Louisiana law constituted a “social
prejudice” strategically placed it beyond the protective pale of the Equal Protection
Clause.
In his dissenting opinion in Plessy, Justice Harlan questioned the legitimacy of the
distinction between social and political equality, and he characterized the right infringed
by the challenged law as a civil right falling within the ambit of guarantees secured by the
Equal Protection Clause.36 Justice Harlan’s dissent expressed considerable concern that
the majority’s holding issued an invitation to the states “to interfere with the full
enjoyment of the blessings of freedom; to regulate civil rights, common to all citizens,
upon the basis of race; and to place in a condition of legal inferiority a large body of
American citizens. . . .”37
The majority’s analysis in Plessy makes plain that the Equal Protection Clause
was not intended to ensure social equality for Blacks. However, the decision fails to
provide a clear way to define social inequality and distinguish it from the kind of political
or legal inequality that falls within the competency of the Clause to proscribe or promote.
The majority’s vagary regarding the distinction between rights and equality secured by
the Equal Protection Clause, and rights and equality that do not enjoy such protection, is
not without constitutional consequence. It set the stage for current affirmative action
jurisprudence and the wholesale rejection of eliminating societal discrimination and
promoting social equality as constitutionally permissible goals.38 Justice Marshall, in his

36
Id. at 561 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (dismissing the majority’s “suggestion that social equality cannot exist between the white and
black races in this country” as an “argument scarcely worthy of consideration.”).
37
Id. at 563. (Harlan, J., dissenting)
38
See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 731 (2007) (“The sweep of the mandate claimed by the
district is contrary to our rulings that remedying past societal discrimination does not justify race-conscious government action.”);

8

dissent in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, described how the Court’s
analytic sleight of hand in Plessy delivered the “ultimate blow to the Civil War
Amendments and to the equality of Negroes. . . . ” and he referenced the “bankruptcy of
the Court’s reasoning.”39
In its 1977 decision in Bakke the Court struck down the affirmative action
program employed by the Medical School of the University of California at Davis, which
set aside 16 of 100 available seats for minority admits. A white student, who was denied
admission to the University twice, challenged the admissions practice as infringing his
equal protection rights. The University proffered four goals as compelling justifications
for its race-conscious admissions program:
(i) reducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in
medical schools and in the medical profession . . . . (ii) countering the
effects of societal discrimination . . . . (iii) increasing the number of
physicians who will practice in communities currently underserved; and
(iv) obtaining the educational benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse
student body.40
Only the diversity rationale was recognized as a compelling state interest.41
Reverberations of the Plessy majority’s determination that social equality is not a
guarantee secured by the Equal Protection Clause are apparent in the Court’s rejection of
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323 (2003); City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989) (“To accept Richmond’s claim
that past societal discrimination alone can serve as the basis for rigid racial preferences would be to open the door to competing claims
for ‘remedial relief’ for every disadvantaged group. . . . We think such a result would be contrary to both the letter and spirit of a
constitutional provision whose central command is equality.”). See also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986)
(distinguishing between societal discrimination and the kind of discrimination that supports race-conscious relief, Justice Powell
opined, “[S]ocietal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy.”); Regents of
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S 265, 310 (1978) (“[T]he purpose of helping certain groups whom the faculty…perceived as victims of
‘societal discrimination’ does not justify a classification that imposes disadvantages upon persons like respondent, who bear no
responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admission program are thought to have suffered.”).
39
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 392
40
Id. at 306
41
Id. at 314–15 (“the interest of diversity is compelling in the context of the university’s admissions program . . . .”). Powell’s
recognition of educational diversity, of which racial diversity is one aspect, was not without controversy. In the wake of the Bakke
decision a question persisted in the Federal Circuit Courts about whether the determination that diversity constituted a compelling
interest commanded a majority of the votes on the Court and whether it should be considered binding precedence. Compare Johnson
v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001), and Hopwood v. Texas 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (deciding
diversity is not a compelling interest), with Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000) (recognizing diversity as
a compelling interest). See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325, (resolving the dispute among the Federal Circuit Courts and affirming the status
of educational diversity as a constitutionally compelling state interest,) (“[W]e endorse Justice Powell’s view that student body
diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions.”). Id.
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the University’s goal of remediating societal discrimination as a compelling justification
for its use of race in the Bakke decision. Justice Marshall remarked in his dissenting
opinion, “had the court been willing in 1896, in Plessy v. Ferguson, to hold that the Equal
Protection Clause forbids differences in treatment based on race, we would not be faced
with this dilemma [of continued racial discrimination] in 1978.”42 Justice Powell, writing
for the majority in Bakke, explained the limited capacity of law to remedy societal
discrimination:
The State certainly has a legitimate and substantial interest in
ameliorating, or eliminating where feasible, the disabling effects of
identified discrimination. . . . We have never approved a classification that
aids persons perceived as members of relatively victimized groups at the
expense of other innocent individuals in the absence of judicial,
legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory
violations (citations omitted). . . . Petitioner does not purport to have
made, and is in no position to make, such findings. Its broad mission is
education, not the formulation of any legislative policy or the adjudication
of particular claims or illegality. . . . Hence, the purpose of helping certain
groups whom the faculty . . . perceived as victims of ‘societal
discrimination’ does not justify a classification that imposes disadvantages
upon persons like respondent, who bear no responsibility for whatever
harm the beneficiaries of the special admission program are thought to
have suffered. To hold otherwise would be to convert a remedy heretofore
reserved for violations of legal rights into a privilege that all institutions
throughout the Nation could grant at their pleasure to whatever groups are
perceived as victims of societal discrimination.43
On the heels of the Bakke decision, Justice Powell reinforced rejection of societal
discrimination as a permissible constitutional aim in Wygant v. Jackson Board of

42
Bakke, 438 U.S at 401. See generally Theresa M. Beiner, Shift Happens: The U.S. Supreme Court's Shifting Antidiscrimination
Rhetoric, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 37, 92–93 (2011) (“[T]he Court's functional abandonment of presumptions of discrimination, as well as
its failure to acknowledge and account for societal discrimination in its modern antidiscrimination jurisprudence, leaves
race . . . discrimination plaintiffs without remedies and tells a story that fails to acknowledge their lived experiences.”).
43
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307–310. For a thoughtful discussion about how cries of reverse discrimination perpetuate inequality and protect
privilege, see William M. Carter, Jr., The Paradox of Political Power: Post-Racialism, Equal Protection, and Democracy, 61 EMORY
L.J. 1123, 1144 (2011) (“[W]hen racial minorities exercise their political power to level the playing field, they often do so in ways that
create visible, individual white ‘victims’ who are perceived as paying the price for something that is not their fault. Subordination of
racial minorities, however, is often accomplished in ways that render individual victims invisible. Accordingly, when racial minorities
use the political process to interrupt the perpetuation of white privilege, we falsely see a world in which a politically dominant group
(racial minorities) is discriminating against discrete and identifiable victims (individual whites). By contrast, because the continued
subordination of racial minorities is often systemic and its causes are often invisible, it is seen as being ‘just the way things are.’”).
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Education.44 At the heart of the dispute in Wygant was an agreement forged between the
Board of Education (“Board”) and the teachers’ union designed to protect recent gains in
the hiring of black teachers from erosion by economically induced layoffs.

The

agreement provided for an exception to the policy that layoffs would be determined
exclusively by seniority and ensured that there would never be a greater number of
minority faculty laid off than the current percentage of minority personnel employed at
the time of the layoffs. The practical effect of the policy was that some non-minority
teachers with greater seniority were terminated in lieu of retaining minority teachers with
less seniority. The articulated purpose for the race-conscious layoff provision was to
provide role models for minority school children.

The Board conceded that it had

presented no evidence of prior discriminatory hiring practices at trial, but it attributed
racialized hiring disparities to societal discrimination.
The Court reversed the lower courts’ decisions upholding the layoff provision45
and in his opinion, on behalf of the majority, Justice Powell buttressed the determination
in Bakke that societal discrimination is a constitutionally deficient justification for the
government’s use of race. He explained,
This Court never has held that societal discrimination alone is sufficient to
justify a racial classification. Rather, the Court has insisted upon some
showing of prior discrimination by the governmental unit involved before
allowing limited use of racial classifications in order to remedy such
discrimination . . . . Societal discrimination, without more, is too
amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy. . . . There are
numerous explanations for a disparity between the percentage of minority
students and the percentage of minority faculty, many of them completely
unrelated to discrimination of any kind. In fact, there is no apparent
connection between the two groups. . . . No one doubts that here has been
serious racial discrimination in this country. But as the basis for imposing
44

476 U.S. 267 (1986).
Id. at 289 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The courts below ruled that a particularized, contemporaneous finding of discrimination was
not necessary and upheld the plan as a remedy for ‘societal’ discrimination, apparently on the assumption that in the absence of a
specific contemporaneous finding, any discrimination addressed by an affirmative action plan could only be termed ‘societal.’”).
45
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discriminatory legal remedies that work against innocent people, societal
discrimination is insufficient and over-expansive. In the absence of
particularized findings, a court could uphold remedies that are ageless in
their reach into the past, and timeless in their ability to affect the future.46
It is now axiomatic that the Equal Protection Clause affords no refuge against
pervasive, societal inequality, which is sometimes acknowledged,47 but determined to be
beyond the constitutional competency of the law to remediate.48 The more remote overt
legal discrimination becomes, the more effectively it can be disguised in the sheep-like
garb of societal discrimination, and the more the distinction forecloses governmental uses
of race. 49

As the signposts of racial discrimination disappear from plain view,

discrimination, like gravity, continues to operate notwithstanding its invisibility, creating
conditions of inequality insulated from remedial state action.50

46

Id. at 276.
Id. (“No one doubts that here has been serious racial discrimination in this country. But as the basis for imposing discriminatory
legal remedies that work against innocent people, societal discrimination is insufficient and over-expansive. In the absence of
particularized findings, a court could uphold remedies that are ageless in their reach into the past, and timeless in their ability to affect
the future.”); Gratz v. Bollinger 539 U.S. 244, 298–300 (2003) (Ginsburg J., dissenting) (observing, “the effects of centuries of law
sanctioned inequality remain painfully evident in our communities and schools.”); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333 (“[R]ace unfortunately still
matters.”); Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 787 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The enduring hope is that race should not matter; the reality
is that too often it does.”); Schuette, 134 U.S. at 1676 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Race also matters because of persistent
racial inequality in society—inequality that cannot be ignored and that has produced stark socioeconomic disparities.”).
48
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 373–74 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court has soundly rejected the remedying of societal discrimination as
a justification for governmental use of race.”); Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 2758 (Chief Justice Roberts remarked, “[R]emedying
past societal discrimination does not justify race-conscious government action.”).
49
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 2773 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Although racial imbalance can result from de jure segregation, it does
not necessarily, and the further [sic] we get from the era of state-sponsored racial separation, the less likely it is that racial imbalance
has a traceable connection to any prior segregation.”). See also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342–43 (“We take the law school at its word that
it would ‘like nothing better than to find a race-neutral admissions formula’ and will terminate its race-conscious admissions program
as soon as practicable (citations omitted). . . . We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be
necessary to further the interest approved today.”).
50
See supra note 20. See also Jasmine A. Williams, "Unemployed (and Black) Need Not Apply": A Discussion of Unemployment
Discrimination, Its Disparate Impact on the Black Community, and Proposed Legal Remedies, 56 HOW. L.J. 629, 631 (2013) (“The
unemployment disparity between the black community and the general community is not surprising because it reflects the status quo
existing long before the recession began. Several factors, such as racial discrimination and access to education, are offered to explain
the gap.”); Karen K. Harris and Kathleen Rubenstein, Eliminating The Racial Wealth Gap: The Asset Perspective, 45
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 74, 79 (2011) (“Although racial discrimination is no longer legal, de facto discrimination still exists in terms of
government and social priorities, principles, and social norms. Housing discrimination, unequal educational systems, disparate
treatment in the realm of criminal justice, and disparate employment opportunities all continue. . . .”); Beverly Moran, Wealth
Redistribution and the Income Tax, 53 HOW. L.J. 319, 333 (2010) (“There is no doubt that slavery betrayed American political ideals
by denying millions of people the ability to obtain wealth and confer that wealth to future generations. These restrictions on the ability
to accumulate and pass on wealth did not end with slavery. Instead, a series of government programs reinforced the wealth disparities
between those citizens that arrived by migration and those who arrived in chains.”); Kevin Outterson, Disentangling Fact From
Fiction: The Realities of Unequal Health Care Treatment: Article: Tragedy and Remedy: Reparations for Disparities in Black Health,
9 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 735, 748 (2005) (“Disparities in Black health arose in the context of slavery and were reinforced by
state action in segregation and discrimination.”).
47

12

The exclusion of societal discrimination from the category of inequality eligible
for state remediation erects a constitutional obstacle that is increasingly more challenging
to clear, as discrimination takes on more clandestine forms. 51 The distinction, first
divined in Plessy, between societal inequality, which the law cannot remediate, and legal
discrimination, which the law is equipped and authorized by the Equal Protection Clause
to address, casts a long shadow over the Court’s consideration of the constitutionality of
governmental uses of race in the educational context. The Plessy majority’s construction
of a constitutionally relevant distinction between societal and legal discrimination
justifies a cramped interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, and it has spawned an
equally dubious and disruptive distinction of its own—the distinction between de jure and
de facto discrimination. It is to the contours of that constitutional convention that the
essay turns.
II.

DE FACTO

AND

DE JURE DISCRIMINATION: AN ARTIFICIAL DIVIDE

OF

CONSTITUTIONAL CONSEQUENCE
The Supreme Court formalized the constitutional significance of the distinction
between de jure and de facto discrimination in Milliken v. Bradley.52 Milliken concerned
a federal district court order directing the desegregation of Detroit’s nearly all black
school district, an urban island surrounded by a sea of nearly all white suburban school
districts. The order was made pursuant to the court’s determination that government
action at multiple levels conspired to produce and maintain a pattern of residential
segregation throughout the city of Detroit that resulted in the segregation of its schools.

51

Marguerite A. Driessen, Toward a More Realistic Standard for Proving Discriminatory Intent, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV.
19, 32 (2002) (“The Court went from a strident acknowledgment of not only the dangers of racial bias, but also of the ease with which
it can be hidden and the difficulty involved in proving it, to a blase requirement that all supplicants at the equal protection bar first
prove that bias.”).
52
418 U.S. 717, 744–45 (1974).
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The issue before the Court was the constitutionality of a plan that mandated interdistrict
busing to desegregate the metropolitan school district. Without regard for the practical
reality that the Detroit public school district could only be desegregated by governmental
action that involved both the suburban and metropolitan districts, a majority of the Court
held that the remedy selected extended beyond the scope of the constitutional violation it
was designed to cure.

It observed, “the record . . . contains evidence of de jure

segregated conditions only in the Detroit schools . . . and the remedy must be limited to
that system.”53 Though the Court acknowledged the segregated state of schools within
the Detroit school district, it did not attribute the segregation to official discrimination by
the state or by the surrounding school districts, and it therefore concluded that it was
unconstitutional for the state to impose an inter-district remedy. 54
In his dissenting opinion in Milliken, Justice Douglas chastised the Court for
creating a distinction that justified a holding “likely [to] put the problems of blacks and
our society back to the period that antedated the ‘separate but equal’ regime of Plessy v.
Ferguson.” 55 He challenged the constitutional relevance and the legitimacy of the
distinction between de jure and de facto discrimination, and he criticized the Court for
characterizing the racialized state action that produced Detroit’s segregated school district
as de facto discrimination, thereby placing it beyond the competency of the law to
remediate.56 He observed,
[T]here is, so far as the school cases go, no constitutional difference
between de facto and de jure segregation. . . . Restrictive covenants
maintained by state action or inaction build black ghettos. It is state action
53

Id. at 746.
Id. at 745–47.
Id. at 759 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
56
Id. at 770 (“I am even more mystified as to how the Court can ignore the legal reality that the constitutional violations, even if
occurring locally, were committed by governmental entities for which the State is responsible and that it is the State that must respond
to the command of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
54
55
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when public funds are dispensed by housing agencies to build racial
ghettos. Where a community is racially mixed and school authorities
segregate schools, or assign black teachers to black schools or close
schools in fringe areas and build new schools in black areas and in more
distant white areas, the State creates and nurtures a segregated school
system just as surely as did those States involved in Brown v. Board of
Education, when they maintained dual school systems. . . . It is
conceivable that ghettos develop on their own, without any hint of state
action. But since Michigan, by one device or another, has, over the years,
created black school districts and white school districts, the task of equity
is to provide a unitary system for the affected area where, as here, the
State washes its hands of its own creations.57
Justice Marshall issued a scathing dissent refusing to subscribe to what he
described as the Milliken majority’s “emasculation of our constitutional guarantee of
equal protection of the laws.”58 Noting the outcome determinative characterization of the
government action that produced Detroit’s segregated school district as de facto
discrimination, Justice Marshall contended,
[T]he evidence . . . showed that Negro children had been intentionally
confined to an expanding core of virtually all-Negro schools immediately
surrounded by a receding band of all-white schools. . . . The constitutional
violation found here was not some de facto racial imbalance, but rather the
purposeful, intentional, massive, de jure segregation of the Detroit city
schools, . . . and justifies ‘all-out desegregation’. . . . [I]nterdistrict relief
was seen as a necessary part of any meaningful effort by the State of
Michigan to remedy the state-caused segregation within the city of
Detroit.59
Thirty-three years later, the Court’s invocation of the de jure/de facto distinction
in Parents Involved v. Seattle School District No. 1,60 dictated the determination that the
race-conscious school transfer plans used to desegregate Seattle’s and Louisville’s public
schools were unconstitutional because the “racial imbalance” in the schools was not a

57

Id. at 761–62 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Milliken, 418 U.S. at 782 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
59
Id. at 785–89.
60
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 735.
58
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consequence of governmental discrimination.61 Citing Milliken, Chief Justice Roberts
explained, “The distinction between segregation by state action and racial imbalance
caused by other factors has been central to our jurisprudence in this area for generations,”
and he chided the dissenting Justices for “elid[ing] this distinction between de jure and de
facto segregation. . . . thus alter[ing] in fundamental ways not only the facts presented
here but the established law.”62
For his part, Justice Thomas devoted a great deal of attention in his concurring
opinion to highlighting de jure discrimination as a constitutional prerequisite for raceconscious state action and to distinguishing it from racial imbalance resulting from de
facto discrimination. He noted,
Because this Court has authorized and required race-based remedial
measures to address de jure segregation, it is important to define
segregation clearly and to distinguish it from racial imbalance. In the
context of public schooling, segregation is the deliberate operation of a
school system to ‘carry out a governmental policy to separate pupils in
schools solely on the basis of race.’ . . . Racial imbalance is the failure of
the school district’s individual schools to match or approximate the
demographic make-up of the student population at large. Racial imbalance
is not segregation. Although presently observed racial imbalance might
result from past de jure segregation, racial imbalance can also result from
any number of innocent private decisions, including voluntary housing
choices. . . . [R]acial imbalance without intentional state action to separate
the races does not amount to segregation. . . . [W]ithout a history of stateenforced racial separation, a school district has no affirmative legal
obligation to take race-based remedial measures to eliminate segregation
and its vestiges. . . . Seattle has no history of de jure segregation;
therefore, the Constitution did not require Seattle’s plan . . . . As for
Louisville, its slate was cleared by the District Court’s 2000 dissolution
decree, which effectively declared that there were no longer any effects of
de jure discrimination in need of remediation. 63 (citations omitted).

61
Id. at 721 (“We have emphasized that the harm being remedied by mandatory desegregation plans is the harm that is traceable to
segregation, and that the ‘Constitution is not violated by racial imbalance in the schools, without more.’”) (quoting Milliken v.
Bradley, 433 U.S. 167, 280 n.14 (1977)).
62
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 736.
63
Id. at 749–55 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Though Justice Kennedy joined the plurality in recognizing the constitutional
relevance of the distinction between de jure and de facto discrimination, he acknowledged
the challenge inherent in discerning between the two. He observed,
The distinction between government and private action . . . can be
amorphous both as a historical matter and as a matter of present-day
finding of fact. Laws arise from a culture and vice versa. Neither can
assign to the other all responsibility for persisting injustices. Yet like so
many other legal categories that can overlap in some instances, the
constitutional distinction between de jure and de facto segregation has
been thought to be an important one.64
After echoing Justice Kennedy’s acknowledgment of the nebulous nature of the de
jure/de facto distinction, 65 Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion criticized the majority’s
misapplication of and reliance upon the delineation in the context of voluntary state action
targeting school segregation. He explained,
The plurality tries to draw a distinction by reference to the wellestablished conceptual difference between de jure segregation
(‘segregation by state action’) and de facto segregation (‘racial imbalance
caused by other factors’). But that distinction concerns what the
Constitution requires school boards to do, not what it permits them to do.
The opinions cited by the plurality to justify its reliance upon the de
jure/de facto distinction only address what remedial measures a school
district may be constitutionally required to undertake. As to what is
permitted, nothing in our equal protection law suggests that a State may
right only those wrongs that it committed. No case of this Court has ever
relied upon the de jure/de facto distinction in order to limit what a school
district is voluntarily allowed to do. . . . [S]ignificant as the difference
between de jure and de facto segregation may be to the question of what a
school district must do, that distinction is not germane to the question of
what a school district may do.66 (citations omitted).

64

Id. at 795 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 819–20 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (“The plans in both Louisville and Seattle grow out of . . . earlier remedial efforts. Both
districts faced problems that reflected initial periods of severe racial segregation, followed by such remedial efforts as busing,
followed by evidence of resegregation, followed by a need to end busing and encourage the return of, e.g., suburban students through
increased student choice. . . . The histories also make clear the futility of looking simply to whether earlier segregation was de jure or
de facto in order to draw firm lines separating the constitutionally permissible from the constitutionally forbidden use of ‘raceconscious’ criteria.”).
66
Id. at 843–44.
65
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Determining discriminatory action to be benign and beyond the reach of
constitutional uses of race by labeling it de facto reflects circuitous reasoning and as
Justice Breyer admonished in Parents Involved, “doom[s] the plurality’s endeavor to find
support for its views in that distinction.”67 Adherence to the de jure/de facto distinction
ignores the reality that state sanctioned discrimination provoked, perpetuated and
facilitated de facto discrimination, and, as Justice Kennedy observed in Parents Involved,
“an injury stemming from racial prejudice can hurt as much when the demeaning
treatment based on race identity stems from bias masked deep within the social order as
when it is imposed by law.”68
Conditioning the constitutionality of governmental uses of race upon nebulous
differences between de jure and de facto discrimination erects an evidentiary obstacle
that insulates inequality from legal remediation. The distinction represents a refined and
expanded version of the enduring divide between societal and legal discrimination
divined in Plessy, with the added advantage of imposing an evidentiary prerequisite for
the government’s use of race.69 Therefore, it imposes a more impervious barrier to state
efforts to cure racial disparities and exclusion, but the de jure/de facto distinction shares
with its predecessor a narrow conception of the power and purpose of the Equal
Protection Clause, by eliminating integration as a constitutional aim within the
competency of the Clause to effect.70

67

Id. at 806.
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 795 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
69
Milliken, 418 U.S. at 756 n.2 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“The Constitution simply does not allow federal courts to attempt to change
[segregated schools] unless and until it is shown that the State, or its political subdivisions, have contributed to cause the situation to
exist. . . . [I]t follows that the situation over which my dissenting Brothers express concern cannot serve as the predicate for the
remedy adopted by the District Court and approved by the Court of Appeals.”).
70
Integration and desegregation are not constitutionally synonymous. Desegregation provides a constitutional justification for the use
of race where sufficient evidence of state discrimination is present. Integration is considered to target societal discrimination and is
traced to de facto discrimination. Accordingly, in Parents Involved the Court refers to racial integration as substantively
indistinguishable from racial balancing and rejects it as a constitutionally permissible end. Chief Justice Roberts observed, “The
principle that racial balancing is not permitted is one of substance, not semantics. Racial balancing is not transformed from ‘patently
68
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III.

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FATIGUE: A POUND OF FLESH FOR RACIAL DIVERSITY
In Bakke the Court identified educational diversity as the sole constitutional

justification for the use of race in admissions, 71 in the absence of “identified
discrimination;” thereby calcifying the constitutional significance of the de jure/de facto
distinction.72 Justice Powell’s selection of the most exacting level of review to test the
constitutionality of the University’s race-conscious admissions program 73 would be
confirmed as the controlling test in Croson, where the Court held that strict scrutiny
applies whether the State’s use of race is to discriminate, to remediate de jure
discrimination, or to achieve educational diversity. 74 The entrenchment of de jure
discrimination as a constitutional prerequisite for state action, and the treatment of state

unconstitutional’ to a compelling state interest simply by relabeling it ‘racial diversity.’ While the school districts use various verbal
formulations to describe the interest they seek to promote—racial diversity, avoiding racial isolation, racial integration—they offer no
definition of the interest that suggests it differs from racial balance.” Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 732. But see Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence in Parents Involved where he suggests the continued viability of integration as a constitutional goal served by the State’s
consideration of race. Referring to the goal of avoiding racial isolation, he observed, “This Nation has a moral and ethical obligation
to fulfill its historic commitment to creating an integrated society that ensures equal opportunity for all of its children. A compelling
interest exists in avoiding racial isolation, an interest that a school district, in its discretion and expertise, may choose to pursue.” Id.
at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
71
Bakke, 438 U.S at 311–12.
72
Id. (“The fourth goal asserted by petitioner is the attainment of a diverse student body. This clearly is a constitutionally permissible
goal for an institution of higher education.”). Limiting the kind of discrimination that qualifies as a constitutionally appropriate target
for state remedial action, Justice Powell noted, “The State certainly has a legitimate and substantial interest in ameliorating, or
eliminating where feasible, the disabling effects of identified discrimination . . . . [A] governmental body must have the authority and
capability to establish, in the record, that the classification is responsive to identified discrimination;” Id. at 307–09. The majority
opinion made clear, that “there was no judicial determination of constitutional violation as a predicate for the formulation of a
remedial classification;” Id. at 301, to which Justice Marshall responded in his dissent, “it is inconceivable that the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended to prohibit all race-conscious relief measures. . . . Such a result would pervert the intent of the Framers by
substituting abstract equality for the genuine equality the Amendment was intended to achieve.” Id. at 398.
73
Id. at 305 (explaining why strict scrutiny is the applicable constitutional test, Justice Powell stated, “We have held that in ‘order to
justify the use of a suspect classification, a State must show that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and
substantial, and that its use of the classification is ‘necessary . . . to the accomplishment’ of its purpose or the safeguarding of its
interest.”).
74
Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (Explaining the rationale for treating racial discrimination and remedial uses of race as constitutionally
asymmetrical and therefore subject to strict scrutiny, the majority opines, “[T]here is simply no way of determining what
classifications are in fact “benign” or ‘remedial’ and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial
inferiority or simple racial politics . . . .”). Justice Marshall laments in his dissenting opinion, “Today for the first time, a majority of
this Court has adopted strict scrutiny as its standard of Equal Protection review of race-conscious remedial measures (citation
omitted). . . . This is an unwelcome development. A profound difference separates governmental actions that seek to remedy the
effects of prior racism or to prevent neutral governmental activity from perpetuating the effects of such racism.” Id. at 551–52
(Marshall, J., dissenting). The perpetuation justification has disappeared from the Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence; But see
generally Ian Haney Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717
(2000) (arguing that racialized institutional practices become entrenched in structures in ways that permit their reproduction without
conscious intent to discriminate); For an exhaustive examination of how federal courts are applying strict scrutiny to government
sponsored minority business program see Derek M. Alphran, Proving Discrimination After Croson and Adarand: “If It Walks Like a
Duck,” 37 USF L. REV. 887 (2003).
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remedial and state discriminatory action as constitutionally symmetrical, turn the Equal
Protection Clause on its head. Instead of the Clause operating as a tool to address and
eliminate inequality, it becomes a weapon that frustrates and forecloses the use of race to
ensure equality.
Strict scrutiny requires that the end served by the use of race be compelling in
nature and that the means employed be narrowly tailored to the goal. 75 The Bakke
decision narrowed the category of constitutionally sanctioned uses of race, in the absence
of de jure discrimination, by universities to a class of one—educational diversity, of
which racial diversity is a part.76 The required means-end fit has been has been assessed
in light of available race-neutral alternatives to achieve diversity.77 However, prior to the
Court’s recent decision in Fisher v. University of Texas, a required showing of the
absence of workable race-neutral alternatives never commanded a majority of the
Court.78 This constitutional predicate renders state efforts to produce racial diversity the
latest casualty of jurisprudential machinations that frustrate affirmative action efforts.
The constitutional status of educational diversity was affirmed in Grutter; 79
however, the Court’s decision nine years later in Fisher severely circumscribed the
means by which it can be constitutionally obtained.

At issue in Fisher was the

constitutionality of the University of Texas’ undergraduate admissions program, which
considered race in order to achieve the educational benefits that result from a racially
75
Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908 (1996) (“[T]he means chosen to accomplish the [state’s] asserted purpose must be specifically and
narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose.” (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280 (1986))); Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (“[T]he means
chosen [must] ‘fit’ [the] compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was
illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.”).
76
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314–15.
77
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339 (“Narrow tailoring does . . . require serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives
that will achieve the diversity the university seeks.”); Croson, 488 U.S. at 507 (“[I]t is almost impossible to assess whether the
Richmond Plan is narrowly tailored to remedy prior discrimination . . . . [T]here does not appear to have been any consideration of the
use of race-neutral means to increase minority business participation in city contracting.”); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280 n.6 (narrow
tailoring “may be used to require consideration of whether lawful alternative and less restrictive means could have been used.”).
78
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339 (2003); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280 n.6 (1986).
79
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325; See supra note 41 for discussion of controversy surrounding whether educational diversity’s
constitutional status as a compelling state interest was a controlling holding of the Court.
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heterogeneous class. The University of Texas had a unique history with respect to its use
of race in admissions. After the Bakke decision, the University like many institutions
invoked Powell’s recognition of educational diversity as a constitutionally permissible
goal, and it implemented a program that relied upon an Academic Index (“AI”)80 and
considered race as a “plus factor” in admissions decisions. In 1996 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held in Hopwood v. Texas that the University of
Texas’ use of race furthered no compelling interest and ruled the program
unconstitutional.81
The next iteration of the University’s admissions program was designed to
comply with the Fifth Circuit’s prohibition of the consideration of race and to obtain a
racially diverse student population.

To this end, the University eliminated the

consideration of race from the admissions calculus and adopted the Personal
Achievement Index (“PAI”). The PAI was a holistic metric which considers a variety of
factors relevant to a student’s background and capacity to contribute to educational
diversity, but race was not a factor.82 In addition, the Texas Legislature adopted the Top
Ten Percent Law, which grants automatic admission to any public, state institution, to all
students who graduate in the top 10% of their high school class. The University of
Texas’ post-Hopwood, recalibrated admissions process, which consisted of the use of the
AI, the PAI and the admission of students under the Top Ten Percent Law, was designed
to ensure a racially diverse student population. Following Supreme Court’s decisions in

80

The Academic Index reflected a student’s test scores and high school academic performance.
78 F.3d at 944 (5th Cir. 1996) (refusing to recognize the precedential value of Powell’s recognition of educational diversity as
constituting a compelling interest).
82
The Personal Achievement Index was designed to consider “a student’s leadership and work experience, awards, extra-curricular
activities, community service, . . .[and other factors, such as] growing up in a single-parent home, speaking a language other than
English at home, significant family responsibilities assumed by the applicant, and the general socioeconomic condition of the
student’s family;” Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2415–16 (2013).
81
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Grutter and Gratz v. Bollinger,83 the University returned to the explicit use of race as a
plus factor in its admissions processes, by including it as a consideration in the PAI.
Abigail Fisher, a white student who was denied admission to the University of
Texas, filed suit and she argued that the use of race as part of the school’s admissions
process violated the Equal Protection Clause. The District Court granted the University’s
motion for summary judgment and the Fifth Circuit affirmed that decision. On appeal,
the Supreme Court did not disturb diversity’s status as a compelling interest, nor did it
decide the constitutionality of the means employed by the University of Texas to achieve
that interest. However, the Court held that the lower court erred by presuming the
University’s consideration of race to have been executed in good faith and that it failed to
apply the correct standard of strict scrutiny.84 The Court remanded the case back to the
Fifth Circuit to determine “whether the University has offered sufficient evidence [to]
prove that its admissions program is narrowly tailored to obtain the educational benefits
of diversity,”85 and the Court instructed that the narrowly tailored requirement requires a
showing of no workable race-neutral alternatives to achieve racial diversity.86 Justice
Kennedy, writing for the majority, opined,
[S]trict scrutiny does require a court to examine with care, and not defer
to, a university’s “serious, good faith consideration of workable raceneutral alternatives.” See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339-340, 123 S.Ct. 2325
(emphasis added). . . . The reviewing court must ultimately be satisfied
that no workable race-neutral alternatives would produce the educational
benefits of diversity. If “ ‘a nonracial approach . . . could promote the
substantial interest about as well and at tolerable administrative expense,’”
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986) (quoting
Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of “Benign” Racial Preferences in Law
School Admissions, 75 Colum. L.Rev. 559, 578-579 (1975)), then the
university may not consider race. . . . [S]trict scrutiny imposes on the
83

Gratz, 539 U.S. at 244 .
Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2421.
85
Id.
86
Id.at 2420.
84
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university the ultimate burden of demonstrating, before turning to racial
classifications, that available, workable race-neutral alternatives do not
suffice.87
An examination of controlling Supreme Court cases reveals negligible support for
the Fisher majority’s novel 88 and exceedingly strict interpretation of what the narrow
tailoring requirement demands. In Wygant, Justice Powell addressed the requirement’s
meaning in a footnote, explaining, “The term ‘narrowly tailored,’ so frequently used in
our cases, has acquired a secondary meaning. More specifically, as commentators have
indicated, the term may be used to require consideration of whether lawful alternative and
less restrictive means could have been used.” 89 Justice Powell references several law
review articles90 but cites no case law in support of the existence of a potential, secondary
meaning of the requirement.91
The Court’s decision in Grutter expressly rejects an interpretation of the narrow
tailoring test as requiring exhaustion of all race-neutral alternatives.92 In Grutter the
Court considered the constitutionality of the University of Michigan Law School’s
admissions program, which considered applicants’ race as a plus factor in the context of
an individualized assessment of each prospective admittee. Rejecting the petitioners’
87

Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Some commentators describe the Court’s acknowledgment of the relevance of race-neutral action by the University’s seeking to
achieve racial diversity as clarifying the narrowly tailored prong of the strict scrutiny test and others characterize it as the adoption of a
new rule. See, e.g., Scott Greytak, New Rules for Affirmative Action in Higher Education: A Practical Guide to Fisher v. University of
Texas for Colleges and Universities, in THE FUTURE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: NEW PATHS TO HIGHER EDUCATION DIVERSITY
AFTER FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS 64 (Richard D. Kahlenberg, ed., 2014) (higher educational attorney Scott Greytak observed,
“Altogether, Justice Kennedy’s modifications have either tightened the Grutter vice, or established an entirely new standard of
review.”); Mae Kuykendall and Charles Adside, III, Unmuting the Volume: Fisher, Affirmative Action Jurisprudence, and the Legacy
of Racial Silence, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1011, 1064 (2014) (“This effort in Fisher to discipline Grutter's looser approach to
strict scrutiny is well grounded in the record discussed in Grutter, but given low salience by the Court.”); Harvard Law Review
Association, Fourteenth Amendment – Equal Protection Clause—Public-University Affirmative Action—Fisher v. University of Texas
at Austin, 127 HARV. L. REV. 258, 267 (2013) (referencing “Fisher’s recalibration of the affirmative action strict scrutiny analysis.”).
See Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, No. 09-50822, 2014 WL 3442449, at *20 (5th Cir. July 15, 2014) (Garza, J., dissenting)
(“Fisher effected a change in the law of strict scrutiny . . . .”).
89
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280 n.6 (emphasis added).
90
See John H. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 727 n. 26 (1974); Kent
Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Preference in Law School Admissions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 578–79 (1975);
Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model For a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20–21 (1972).
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See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr. and Paul C. Weiler, Conflicting Models of Racial Justice, 1984 S. CT. REV. 1, 58 (1985).
92
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339.
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argument that the admissions practice failed to satisfy the nexus prong of the strict
scrutiny test, Justice O’Connor opined, “Petitioner and the United States argue that the
Law School’s plan is not narrowly tailored because race-neutral means exist to obtain the
educational benefits of student body diversity that the Law School seeks. We disagree.
Narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral
alternative.”93
Though Supreme Court majority and plurality opinions provide no support for an
interpretation of the narrow tailoring test as requiring exhaustion of all race-neutral
options before employing race-conscious measures, Justice Kennedy’s concurring and
dissenting opinions repeatedly reference such a requirement, positioning it to receive the
imprimatur of the Court in Fisher.94 In Parents Involved, decided just five years before,
he wrote in his concurring opinion,
[W]hen de facto discrimination is at issue our tradition has been that the
remedial rules are different. The State must seek alternatives to the
classification and differential treatment of individuals by race . . . . A
compelling interest exists in avoiding racial isolation, an interest that a
school district, in its discretion and expertise, may choose to pursue.
Likewise, a district may consider it a compelling interest to achieve a
diverse student population. . . . Even so, measures other than differential
treatment based on racial typing of individuals first must be exhausted.”95

93

Id. at 339 (emphasis added). In Justice Kennedy’s dissenting opinion he charges the majority with misapplying the strict scrutiny
test. He observed, “The Court confuses deference to a university’s definition of its educational objective with deference to the
implementation of this goal. . . . [D]eference is not to be given with respect to the methods by which it is pursued. . . . Deference is
antithetical to strict scrutiny, not consistent with it.” Id. at 388 – 94 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
94
Judge Patrick Higginbothom of the Fifth Circuit, remarked during a November 2013 hearing of the remanded Fisher case:
“What is the unfairness of letting [the University of Texas] go forward under the [Fisher] standard? We
obviously—the district court and this court—were seriously mistaken in not following the dissent in Grutter, by
not having anticipated that it would become [the rule]. Going forward, in fairness perhaps, [the University of
Texas] ought to be allowed to meet the standard [in Fisher]. One can say, “Well that’s always the standard.”
Well, of course strict scrutiny was always the standard, but it was strict scrutiny as stated by Justice O’Connor
to which Justice Kennedy dissented [in Grutter.]” Greytak, supra note 88 at 58.
95
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 796–98 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Importantly, he cites no authority supporting the constitutional predicate; however, his
pronouncement prefaced the recalibration of the nexus prong of the strict scrutiny test in
Fisher.96
Though Justice Kennedy concedes in his opinion in Fisher that the Grutter
decision expressly repudiated an exhaustion requirement as a predicate, his “no workable
race-neutral alternatives” requirement clearly echoes the exhaustion test he articulated in
Parents Involved.97 Conspicuously absent from his opinion in Fisher is any reference to
prior cases by the Court supporting the test as a constitutional requirement, except for a
citation to Justice Powell’s reference in Wygant to a possible alternative interpretation of
the narrowly tailored test, proposed in several law review articles.98
The Court’s novel construction of narrow tailoring is carefully calibrated to
foreclose the use of race in furtherance of racial equality and to facilitate racial neutrality,
which Justice Kennedy described as the “driving force of the Equal Protection Clause.”99
His confidence, which he expressed in his Croson concurrence, “that, in application, the
strict scrutiny standard will operate in a manner generally consistent with the imperative
of race-neutrality, because it forbids the use even of narrowly drawn racial classifications

96

Judge Garza, dissenting from the Fifth Circuit’s affirmance of the District Court’s decision on remand from the Supreme Court,
traces the “modifi[cation of] the narrow tailoring calculus” to Justice Kennedy’s dissenting opinions in Grutter and in Parents
Involved. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 665 (5th Cir. July 15, 2014) (Garza, J., dissenting). He noted, “[U]sing
racial classifications is permissible only as a ‘last resort to achieve a compelling interest.”). Id. at 666; See also Greytak, supra note
88, at 64 (“Though Justice Kennedy preserves plenty of language from the Grutter decision in Fisher, including Justice O’Connor’s
upper limit, ‘exhaustion’ qualification, his resolution of the Gratz-Grutter-[Parents Involved] inconsistency most closely resembles the
“last resort” language he introduced in [Parents Involved].”).
97
See supra note 95, at 798.
98
See supra note 91. Judge A. Leon Higgonbotham’s analysis of the majority opinion in Plessy expressed an insight relevant to
Justice Kennedy’s analytical sleight of hand in Fisher. He noted, “As one reads neatly printed Supreme Court opinions, there is a
tendency to give some presumption of rationality to the writings because of their format and dignified style. Yet on great issues of
public policy, some opinions do nothing more than to mask with civil terminology a justice’s intention to distort the record or to give
an imprimatur of logic that does not exist to those familiar with the evolution of the precedential case law. There can be no more
deceptive approach than when a Court improperly . . . relies upon cases as having precedential significance in determining the case at
issue.” JUDGE A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM RACIAL POLITICS AND PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL
PROCESS 113 (Oxford University Press 1996).
99
Croson, 488 U.S. at 518 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The moral imperative of racial neutrality is the driving force of the Equal
Protection Clause”).
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except as a last resort,”100 foreshadows the Court’s holding in Fisher. This colorblind
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause sanctions a constitutional predicate that
creates an evidentiary impasse for efforts to promote racial diversity and destines
affirmative action efforts for defeat.101 As Justice Blackmun observed in his dissent in
Bakke, “I suspect that it would be impossible to arrange an affirmative action program in
a racially neutral way and have it [be] successful. To ask, that this be so is to demand the
impossible.”102

IV.

RACING TO NEUTRALITY: HEAR NO RACE, SEE NO RACE, SPEAK NO RACE TO
ACHIEVE RACIAL DIVERSITY
Employing race-neutral means to create racial diversity may be, as Justice

Blackmun intimates, an exercise in futility; however, the Court’s recent decision in
Fisher, informs that their use is, nevertheless, constitutionally required. On remand, in
Fisher v. University of Texas, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed the District Court’s grant of
summary judgment to the University of Texas and upheld the constitutionality of its raceconscious admissions program. 103 The Fifth Circuit’s majority opinion provides a
detailed account of the University’s use of race-neutral efforts to achieve racial diversity
including the Top Ten Percent Plan and the school’s extensive and coordinated outreach,
scholarship and recruitment efforts.104 The majority described these race-neutral efforts
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Id. at 519.
Greytak, supra note 88, at 59 (observing, “Fisher represents a deliberate and measured step forward on the path to colorblindness.
It is a blueprint for destabilizing race-conscious admissions plans. This is our warning, and we must react accordingly.”).
102
Bakke, 438 U.S at 407. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
103
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 637 (5th Cir. July 15, 2014) (“With the benefit of additional briefing, oral
argument, and the ordered exacting scrutiny, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.”).
104
Id. at 665 (“Put simply, this record shows that UT Austin implemented every race-neutral effort that its detractors now insist must
be exhausted prior to adopting a race conscious admissions program.”).
101
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as insufficient to move enrollment “towards a critical mass of minority students,”105 and
therefore determined the University’s use of race to comply with the Supreme Court’s
new constitutional prerequisite of no workable race-neutral alternatives. The court held,
Interlacing the Top Ten Percent Plan, with its dependence upon
segregated schools to produce minority enrollment, with a plan that did
not consider race until it had a universe of applicants clearing a high
hurdle of demonstrated scholastic performance strongly supports UT
Austin’s assertion that its packaging of the two was necessary in its pursuit
of diversity. . . .And when race enters it is deployed in the holistic manner
of Grutter as a factor of a factor. . . .To reject the UT Austin plan is to
confound developing principles of neutral affirmative action looking away
from Bakke and Grutter, leaving them in uniform but without command—
due only a courtesy salute in passing.106
The University of Texas’ unique history of race-neutral and race- conscious
admissions practices allowed it to satisfy the strictures of the Court’s modified narrowly
tailored test.107 However, as the Fifth Circuit majority conceded, “UT Austin’s efforts to
achieve diversity without facial consideration of race, its narrow tailoring of its admission
process, in one of the country’s largest states, offers no template for others.”108 This
holding does not ensure that other institutions will easily clear the evidentiary hurdle the
new test erects. In fact, as the Fifth Circuit majority intimates in its opinion, the efforts
by the University of Texas may establish a heightened factual predicate for the quantum
and quality of race-neutral efforts necessary to survive strict scrutiny analysis that other
schools will struggle to meet. Affirmative action may have survived a battle with the
validation of the University of Texas’ race-conscious program, but the Supreme Court’s
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Id. at 666.
Id. at 659–60 (emphasis added).
107
Fisher, No. 09-50822, 2014 WL 3442449, at *21 n5 (5th Cir. July 15, 2014) (Garza, J., dissenting) (“I agree with the majority that
Fisher represents a decisive shift in the law.”).
108
Fisher, No. 09-50822, 2014 WL 3442449, at *17 (5th Cir. July 15, 2014) (emphasis added). See Greytak, supra note 88 at 70–71
(“[I]mportantly, an airtight strategy (short of exhausting every conceivable race-neutral alternative) remains elusive: UT claimed that
it experimented with race-neutral alternatives for seven years, and even incorporated SES factors into their admissions calculations
(citation omitted). UT also devoted a year to reviewing these policies before adopting its race-conscious plan (citation omitted).
Nevertheless, at Fisher’s rehearing, the attorney for Abigail Fisher insisted on more. ‘Where’s the study?’ he asked.”).
106
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interpretation of Equal Protection as demanding racial neutrality, signals that affirmative
action may ultimately lose the war.
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Parents Involved and Fisher,
scholars have cast about for race-neutral measures, with varying capacities for addressing
de facto segregation and for yielding racial diversity sufficient to produce pedagogical
benefits. In the K-12 context, alternatives include: using class or socioeconomic status as
a proxy for race, 109 redrawing school attendance zones, 110 using zip codes, 111 creating
magnet schools,112 and establishing inter-district programs.113 Race-neutral efforts in the
K-12 context that successfully utilize proxies for race are vulnerable to invalidation
pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Milliken and Parents Involved, wherein it
rejects addressing de facto discrimination (i.e., ensuring racial diversity, integration,
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Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Constitutional Future Of Race-Neutral Efforts to Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in
Elementary and Secondary Schools, 50 B.C. L. REV 277, 337 (2009) (“Student assignment plans that integrate students based upon
socioeconomic status have grown in popularity over the past fifteen years, particularly since 2000, their having been adopted in
approximately forty districts that educate 2.5 million students.”). See generally Taryn Williams, Note, Outside the Lines: The Case
for Socioeconomic Integration in Urban School Districts, 2010 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 435 (2010).
110
Robinson, supra note 109, at 339 (“School districts also may seek to promote diversity and avoid racial isolation by drawing
attendance-zone boundaries so as to bring together students from a racially mixed group of neighborhoods and to address segregated
housing patterns, which represent the primary cause of segregated schools.”). See generally Joseph 0. Oluwole & Preston C. Green,
Grating Race-Conscious Student Assignment Plans in the Cauldron of Parents Involved v. Seattle School District, 56 WAYNE L. REV.
1655 (2010). In his concurrence in Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy noted several mechanisms for attracting students of diverse
backgrounds. He recommended: “strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with general recognition of the
demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion; and
tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by race.” Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 789.
111
Danielle Allen, Talent is Everywhere: Using Zip Codes and Merit to Enhance Diversity, in THE FUTURE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION:
NEW PATHS TO HIGHER EDUCATION DIVERSITY AFTER FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS 147 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2014)
(Allen observed, “My suggestion is that the pursuit of geographic diversity in admissions is our best hope of merging the goals of
diversity and excellence. This could and should be taken to the level of ZIP codes and, in particular, to the level of the ZIP+4 system,
which divides the United States into geographic units as small as a city block or group of apartments. Given current residential
patterns—with their extremely high degree of socioeconomic, racial, ethnic and ideological segregation . . . among others—
geographic diversity at the level of ZIP+4 address codes should bring other sorts of valuable diversity along with it.”).
112
Robinson, supra note 109 at 340 (“Some districts may be able to develop magnet schools to promote diversity and avoid racial
isolation. Magnet schools seek to enroll a diverse student population by developing specialized programs, such as a specialized
subject matter, theme, or unique pedagogical approach that attracts students away from their private or neighborhood schools.”). But
see R. Kenneth Godwin et al., Sinking Swann: Public School Choice and the Resegregation of Charlotte's Public Schools, 23 REV. OF
POL’Y RES. 983 (2006) (highlighting the practical effects of race-neutral diversification policy of Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools after
2002).
113
Robinson, supra note 109 at 342 (“Some communities also may adopt interdistrict race-neutral approaches, such as allowing
students to transfer between districts. Interdistrict approaches have been adopted in cities such as Hartford, Connecticut; Boston,
Massachusetts; and St. Louis, Missouri, and have gained suburban support because of the diversity that such programs bring to white
schools.”).
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racial balancing and avoiding racial isolation) as a compelling justification for the use of
race.114
In the higher-education context, alternatives include percentage plans,115 the use
of class or socioeconomic status as a proxy for race, 116 the development of minority
pipeline programs, aggressive recruitment and outreach efforts, and increasing
scholarship awards to students of color. 117

Some of these measures may prove

successful;118 however, their constitutionally required use ignores the reality of race as a
unique, non-fungible aspect of one’s experience in America,119 and they ignore the reality
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Milliken, 418 U.S. at 745–47; Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 732.
Matthew N. Gaertner and Melissa Hart, Considering Class: College Access and Diversity, 7 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 367, 374–75
(2013) (“Texas implemented the first top X percent plan in 1997, announcing that any student graduating from the top ten percent of a
Texas high school was guaranteed admission into a state college or university, including the state's flagship institutions. California
followed suit with a commitment to guarantee admission to one of the state colleges or universities for students in the top four percent
of their in-state high-school class who completed certain coursework. And Florida guarantees admission to the top twenty percent of
Florida high-school graduates, provided they complete a college preparatory curriculum.”).
116
See Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action , 88 GEO. L. J. 2331, 2332 (2000).
For an in depth discussion of class-based affirmative action see Richard D. Kahlenberg, THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE AND
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (Basic Books 1996). For thoughtful critiques of the use of class as a proxy for race; see generally Deborah
Malamud, Affirmative Action, Diversity and the Middle Class, 68 U. Colo. L. Rev. 939, 967–87 (1997); Linda F. Wightman, The
Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School
Admission Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. LAW REV. 1 (1997); Tung Yin, A Carbolic Smoke Ball for the Nineties: Class-Based Affirmative
Action, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 213 (1997); see also Sheryll Cashin, PLACE NOT RACE 79 (Beacon Press 2014) (citing “[r]ecent
research on disadvantage-based affirmative action that considered a complex range of factors beyond parental income, including
parental education, language, neighborhood, and high school demographics, found that such programs would raise African American
and Latino enrollment nearly as much as race-based affirmative action while also increasing economic diversity (footnote omitted).”).
117
Halley Potter, Transitioning to Race-Neutral Admissions: An Overview of Experiences in States Where Affirmative Action Has
Been Banned, in THE FUTURE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: NEW PATHS TO HIGHER EDUCATION DIVERSITY AFTER FISHER V.
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS 75-76 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2014) (examining ten states—educating nearly 30 percent of the national
high school population— that have banned or placed severe restrictions on the use of racial affirmative action and have employed
other methods to produce diversity.) Potter highlights several different race-neutral options that have been employed including:
spending money to create new partnerships with disadvantaged schools to improve the pipeline of low-income and minority students;
providing new admissions preferences to low income and working-class students of all races; expanding financial-aid budgets and
increasing targeted scholarship awards to support the needs of economically disadvantaged students; dropping legacy preferences for
the generally privileged—and disproportionately white—children of alumni; creating policies to admit students who graduated at the
top of their high-school classes; and creating programs designed to facilitate transfer from community colleges to four-year
institutions. Id. at 77–79.
118
Id. at 88 (reporting, “many public universities have feared that this policy change would be devastating to racial and ethnic
diversity on their campus. However, for the most part, this has not been the case. Out of 11 flagship public universities in nine states
where the use of race in admissions has at one time been eliminated, seven were able, at some point under race-neutral admissions, to
meet or exceed the level of enrollment of underrepresented minority students . . . seen in the year prior to the ban taking effect.”).
Professor Cashin highlighted the pattern of declining rates of minority enrollment at selective schools in states that have banned the
use of race in admissions, but she points to “a recent study of the impact of affirmative action bans in four states (California,
Washington, Texas and Florida) [which] found that total enrollment of unrepresented minorities did not change at four-year
universities. Cashin, supra note 116, at 77.
119
Fisher, 2014 WL 3442449, at *15 (“Bakke accepts that skin color matters—it disadvantages and ought not be relevant but it is.”);
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333 (“Just as growing up in a particular region or having particular professional experiences is likely to affect an
individual’s views, so too is one’s own, unique experience of being a racial minority in a society, like our own, in which race
unfortunately still matters.”); David Leonhardt, If Affirmative Action is Doomed, What Next?, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/17/upshot/if-affirmative-action-is-doomed-whats-next.html?_r=0&abt=0002&abg=0 (“The biggest
downside to these class-based approaches is that they don’t acknowledge the role that race plays in American society. If you somehow
found otherwise identical white and black students — living in the same neighborhood, with the same income, wealth and structure —
the black student would still probably have to do more just to keep up. Racism is not dead, as social-science research makes clear.”).
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that using non-racial means to approximate race is ultimately untenable.120 Furthermore
the required, reductionist use of race as “a factor of a factor” and the reformulation of
affirmative action as “neutral affirmative action” to satisfy the demands of strict scrutiny,
limit affirmative action efforts’ capacity to produce racial diversity.121
Many race-neutral measures (percentage plans and use of zip codes) are plagued
by the reality that they are race-neutral in name only, as they rely upon racial segregation
to produce racial diversity.122 Describing this phenomenon, the Fifth Circuit observed in
Fisher,
The sad truth is that the Top Ten Percent Plan gains diversity from a
fundamental weakness in the Texas secondary education system. The de facto
segregation of schools in Texas (citation omitted) enables the Top Ten Percent
Plan to increase minorities in the mix . . . . While [it] boosts minority
enrollment by skimming from the tops of Texas high schools, it does so
against this backdrop of increasing resegregation in Texas public schools
(citation omitted), where over half of Hispanic students and 40% of black
students attend a school with 90%-100% minority enrollment.123
Arguably, the construction of percentage plans as race-neutral positions them at cross
purposes with efforts to desegregate K-12 schools, because if elementary and secondary
schools were integrated percentage plans would be less effective tools for creating racial
diversity.124 Moreover, empirical data suggest that race-neutral methods do not yield a
measure of racial diversity sufficient to produce enhanced educational outcomes. 125

See also Neil Gotanda, A Critique of ‘Our Constitutions Is Colorblind, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 28–29, 47–48 (1991) (charging the Court
with employing analysis in its decisions that disassociate racial identity and racial experience).
120
Bakke, 438 U.S at 407 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See Greytak, supra note 88 at 69 (“Simply put, if a college or university’s goal
is to enroll a certain proportion of black or Latino students, there is simply no more efficient way to achieve this goal than to use raceconscious admissions. A strict efficiency standard, therefore, would render all race-neutral strategies unworkable.”).
121
Fisher, 2014 WL 3442449, at *18.
122
As Justice Ginsburg observed in her dissent in Fisher, “I have said before and reiterate here that only an ostrich could regard the
supposedly neutral alternatives as race unconscious (citations omitted) . . . . Texas’ percentage plan was adopted with racially
segregated neighborhoods and schools front and center state.” Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2433 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
123
Fisher, 2014 WL 3442449, at *10–*11. See generally Jeffrey Selingo, What States Aren’t Saying About the XPercent Solution, 46
CHRON. HIGHER ED. A31, A32 (2000).
124
Danielle Holley & Delia Spencer, The Texas Ten Percent Plan, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 245, 277 (1999).
125
In Justice Sotomayor’s dissent from the majority opinion in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, she provides a
detailed account of the harmful impact of state legislation in Michigan and California on racial diversity at colleges and universities in
those states. Schuette,134 S. Ct. 1623 at 1676–82 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). See also Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in
Legal Education: An Empirical Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admission Decisions,
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Pipeline programs, outreach, scholarship awards, and recruitment efforts require that
universities maintain a theoretical commitment to racial diversity, as having educational
value, and make a financial commitment to producing it.
Another, more controversial proposed race-neutral measure is for universities to
reduce their reliance on standardized test scores and to redefine merit and qualifications
in ways that would increase the admission of students of color.126 The majority opinion
in Grutter rejects the idea that the consideration of race, as one of many factors relevant
to admission decisions, is incongruent with the retention of a school’s reputation as an
academically rigorous institution.127 On that point Justice O’Connor opined, “We are
satisfied that the Law School adequately considered race-neutral alternatives currently
capable of producing a critical mass without forcing the Law School to abandon the
academic selectivity that is the cornerstone of its educational mission.”128 Chiding the
majority for allowing the University of Michigan Law School to have its cake and
diversity too, Justice Thomas remarked,
The Law School believes both that the educational benefits of a racially
engineered student body are large and that adjusting its overall admissions
standards to achieve the same racial mix would require it to sacrifice its
elite status. If the Law School is correct that the educational benefits of
"diversity" are so great, then achieving them by altering admissions
standards should not compromise its elite status. The Law School’s
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 18–22 (1997) (presenting data supporting the view that affirmative action is necessary in maintaining racially
diverse schools).
126
See Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436,
1441–42 (2005) ( “The Gutter majority tacitly accepted the premise . . . that, by virtue of better than average performance on the
relevant admissions criteria, the plaintiffs were more qualified for—and hence more deserving of admission to—the law school than
were the affirmative action admits . Hoping to draw attention to the issue of discrimination, the intervenors . . . asserted that
affirmative action was justified as a remedy for the university’s reliance on discriminatory admissions criteria. . . . The claim of
credential bias was met with silence, even in concurrences by Justices Ginsburg, Souter, Stevens, and Breyer, Ginsburg.” (citation
omitted)). See also JOHN BRITTAIN & BENJAMIN LANDY, Reducing Reliance on Testing to Promote Diversity, in THE FUTURE OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: NEW PATHS TO HIGHER EDUCATION DIVERSITY AFTER FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS 160, 173 (Richard
D. Kahlenberg ed., 2014) (“Wake Forest is just one of many colleges and universities that are leading the way in proving that reduced
reliance on standardized testing can increase diversity without sacrificing academic quality. They are also helping to redefine merit as
based on years of achievement in the classroom, not innate (or coached) aptitude for a single, four-hour test.”); William C. Kidder,
Portia Denied: Unmasking Gender Bias on the LSAT and its Relationship to Racial Diversity in Legal Education, 12 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 1, 21, n.92 (2000) (highlighting LSAC warnings and recommendations for appropriate use and limitations of test scores).
127
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340.
128
Id.
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reluctance to do this suggests that the educational benefits it alleges are
not significant or do not exist at all.129
In light of the foregoing analysis, the use of race-neutral measures to produce
racial diversity and to address de facto segregation affords affirmative action little
constitutional footing when considered within the context of the Court’s increasingly
pinched equal protection jurisprudence.

The Court’s contemporary reading and

application of the Equal Protection Clause positions desegregation and racial diversity
efforts between a constitutional rock and a jurisprudential hard place and may motivate
even the most optimistic observers to admit that affirmative action’s days are
numbered.130 Moreover, even if some race-neutral methods prove successful, it is prudent
to consider whether the end (i.e., producing some racial diversity), justifies the means
(i.e., satisfying the increasingly strict requirements of the Equal Protection Clause and
acquiescing to racial neutrality, rather than racial equality, as its central command).131
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Id. at 356 n.4 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia expressed agreement with Justice Thomas’ critique of the majority opinion in
this regard. He observed, “I find particularly unanswerable [Justice Thomas’] central point: that the allegedly ‘compelling state
interest’ at issue here is not the incremental ‘educational benefit’ that emanates from the fabled ‘critical mass’ of minority students,
but rather Michigan’s interest in maintaining a ‘prestige’ law school whose normal admissions standards disproportionately exclude
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in Grutter, see Tomiko Brown-Nagin, The Transformative Racial Politics of Justice Clarence Thomas?: The Grutter v. Bollinger
Opinion 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 787, 800 (2005) (“Justice Thomas seized upon what he viewed as the twisted nature of the University's
argument: the choice between ‘selectivity’ and ‘diversity’ was one of its own making. But for the University's heavy reliance upon
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Greytak, supra note 88, at 71–72 (“Though Fisher’s full impact remains to be seen, it has introduced a novel, and potentially
viable, means of dismantling race-conscious admissions policies through its quiet reformation of the Grutter standard. . . . For while
many in higher education believe that pursuing racial and ethnic diversity is a beneficial and just endeavor, they nevertheless serve
their communities best when they make preparations for the worst.”).
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Professor Michelle Alexander explains the importance of resisting the temptation to engage in race neutral reform efforts in the
criminal justice context that is instructive to considerations of the utility and wisdom of employing race neutral methods to achieve
racial diversity in the education context. She cautions, “[O]pportunities for challenging mass incarceration on purely race-neutral
grounds have never been greater. . . . This is tempting bait . . . but racial justice advocates should not take it. The prevailing caste
system cannot be successfully dismantled with a purely race-neutral approach. . . . Even if fairly dramatic changes were achieved
while ignoring race, the results would be highly contingent and temporary.” MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 226–27 (2010). See also Greytak, supra note 88 at 59 (“I do not support an
admissions system that purges race from the admissions process in the name of political expediency. While 'class-based affirmative
action’ is a praiseworthy contingency plan for a world where race-conscious affirmative action has been outlawed, I believe it exists
today as an unfortunate byproduct of our lingering inability to comprehend America’s ongoing struggle with racism.”).
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CONCLUSION: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION’S PRECARIOUS PROSPECTS IN A COLORBLIND
COURT
In a poignant indictment of the American criminal justice system, Professor
Michelle Alexander makes an insightful observation relevant to the ambivalence that
surrounds affirmative action’s contemporary relevance to the quest for educational equity
and racial diversity. She noted,
A new civil rights movement cannot be organized around the relics of the
earlier system . . . if it is to address meaningfully the racial realities of our
time. Any racial justice movement, to be successful, must vigorously
challenge the public consensus that underlies the prevailing system of
control.132
In the education context the prevailing public consensus that manufactures inequality and
exclusion is the belief that blindness is the appropriate response to the “meaningless
illusion” of race. This perspective informs the Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence
and it is reflected in Court opinions saturated with references to color blindness as a
constitutionally required ideal.133 There is a profound difference between closing one’s
eyes and being blind. The Supreme Court has consistently done the former and claimed
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ALEXANDER, supra note 131, at 211.
“[T]he Court's current colorblind jurisprudence has been described as ‘an approach to constitutional equality under which actual
outcomes are largely irrelevant . . . . Therefore, rather than representing an idyllic vision of equality, color-blindness represents
nothing more than a laudable goal elevated, to protect the racial status quo, into a formal rule of law. ” Daniel Steuer, Another Brick
in the Wall: Attorney's Fees for the Civil Rights Litigant after Buckhannon, 11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 53, 68 (2004) (citation
omitted) (quoting DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 136 (4th ed. 2000)). Justice Harlan’s reference to our
colorblind constitution, see Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896). (Harlan, J., dissenting), has been invoked by the Court on
numerous occasions in support of arguments against a reading of the Equal Protection Clause as accommodating efforts to remediate
racial discrimination. However, Justice Brennan rejoined in his dissenting opinion in Bakke, “[N]o decision of this court has ever
adopted the proposition that the Constitution must be colorblind.” Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S 265, 336 (1978)
(Brennan, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Brennan explained, “The assertion of human equality is closely
associated with the proposition that differences in color or creed, birth or status, are neither significant nor relevant to the way in
which persons should be treated. Nonetheless, the position that such factors must be ‘constitutionally an irrelevance’ summed up by
the shorthand phrase ‘[o]ur Constitution is color-blind,’ has never been adopted by this Court as the proper meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause.” Id. at 355 (citation omitted).
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the latter.134

As Professor Alexander has observed, “The new caste system, unlike its

predecessors, is officially colorblind. We must deal with it on its own terms.”135
The Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence invokes colorblindness as the central
mandate of the Equal Protection Clause; thereby, “constitutionalizing its wishful
thinking.”136 Against this backdrop, as we consider the rumors of affirmative action’s
demise, which seem far more accurate than exaggerated, we should also consider whether
it is worth preserving. The query is not provoked by ambivalence as to the continued
salience of substantive educational equity or the pedagogical value of racial diversity.
Rather, it responds to the reality that affirmative action, in its current condition –
weakened by the Court’s consistent calibration of constitutional rules to foreclose
meaningful progress, may not be adequate for the task at hand.137 Colorblindness as
ideology and doctrine holds educational equality and racial diversity hostage and renders
affirmative action efforts, operating as they must within an increasingly binding (and
blinded) jurisprudential framework, ineffectual.

Unless and until colorblindness is

excised from the collective consciousness and the Equal Protection Clause is liberated
from the Supreme Court’s myopic view of its mandate, affirmative action is relegated to
rearranging inequality rather than ensuring equality.138
The unanimity that produced the Brown decision was short lived.

The

jurisprudential inversions addressed in this essay emerge from splintered opinions issued
by an increasingly divided Supreme Court, in the wake of the Brown decision and assume
134
See Croson, 488 U.S. at 558 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“the majority closes its eyes to . . . constitutional history and social
reality.”).
135
ALEXANDER, supra note 20, at 211.
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Croson, 488 U.S. at 552 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
137
Professor Alexander conducts and even more severe examination of the utility of affirmative action, asking, “[T]o what extent has
affirmative action helped us remain blind to, and in denial about, the existence of a racial undercaste? And to what extent have the
battles over affirmative action distracted us and diverted crucial resources and energy away from dismantling the structures of racial
inequality.” ALEXANDER, supra note 20 at, 234.
138
Professor Alexander charges diversity-driven affirmative action programs with “creat[ing] the appearance of racial equity without
the reality and . . . without fundamentally altering any of the structures that create racial inequality in the first place.” Id. at 236.
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precedential and preemptive force. The Court’s relentless adherence to an interpretation
of the Equal Protection Clause as mandating racial neutrality has provided the drum beat
that accompanies the steady retreat from Brown’s promise of educational equality. 139
The conception of equality embraced by many on the Supreme Court informs that
affirmative action’s constitutional standing is in grave jeopardy and reduces equality to a
mere platitude. So, where do we go from here?140
It is beyond the scope of this essay to address jurisprudential solutions to the
problem of the educational inequality that continues to characterize the American
education system, particularly in light of its conclusion that the Equal Protection Clause
forecloses, rather than facilities, the way forward.141 For all of its limitations, affirmative
action has afforded educational opportunities to many who may have otherwise been
denied access, due to racial discrimination and racial bias.142 Beneficiaries of affirmative
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As Professor West insightfully observes, “Brown v. Board of Education can readily be read, perhaps must be read, as embracing a
substantive account of the Equal Protection Clause: separate and unequal educational facilities produce unequal educational
opportunities, contributing directly to the subordination of blacks and dominance of whites in an already white-dominated society
(citation omitted) . . . . however, the meaning of both the Equal Protection Clause and Brown [would change] dramatically. . . . [T]he
substantive, antisubordinationist meaning of Brown [would begin] to erode as it came to be possible to read the clause as conveying
only a formal, antidiscrimination meaning.” ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 91 (1994) (citation omitted). See generally, Gotanda, supra note 119.
140
This profound question was the title of the last book authored by Dr. Martin Luther King before his assassination. MARTIN
LUTHER KING JR., WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE: CHAOS OR COMMUNITY? (1967).
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See Lia Epperson, Equality Dissonance: Jurisprudential Limitations and Legislative Opportunities, 7 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 213,
237–38 (2011) (Professor Epperson recommends “[s]ubstantial legislative innovations” in addition to enforcement mechanisms and
accountability structures to remedy educational inequities and she identifies “Congressional power in this realm . . . [as] a mechanism
for ensuring that the promise of equality is realized for all.”); Sheryll Cashin, Place, Not Race: Affirmative Action and the Geography
of Educational Opportunity, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 935, 959–65 (2014) (Professor Cashin proposes that universities resist using
the term “affirmative action” because of its loaded meanings and embrace the initiative of “diversity practice.” She supports an
explicit reference to diversity as a goal in university mission statements and the redefinition of merit, for admission and financial aid
purposes, to include criteria that reflect a commitment to diversity. She suggests increasing admissions staff to ensure each applicant
receives “careful, holistic consideration”, and she recommends that the term “low-opportunity neighborhood” replace references to
race during the admissions process, as a strategy for achieving educational equity.); John V. Wintermute, Remedying Race-Based
Decision-Making: Reclaiming the Remedial Focus of Affirmative Action after Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 44 Seton Hall L.
Rev. 557, 593 (Professor Wintermute advocates for the adoption of a race-conscious remedial policy to counter intentional
discrimination and proposes a three step process for doing so: 1) identify forms of race-based decision-making in the public school
system; (2) identify quantifiable disparities resulting from such discrimination; and (3) present a "strong basis in evidence" that
remedial action is necessary to alleviate the harms caused by racial discrimination.).
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See Brown-Nagin, supra note 126, at 1441 (“[H]oping to draw attention to the issue of discrimination, the intervenors . . . asserted
that affirmative action was justified as a remedy for the university’s reliance on discriminatory admissions criteria. ”); Deirdre M.
Bowen, American Skin, Dispensing with Colorblindness and Critical Mass in Affirmative Action, 73 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 339, 342–47
(2011) (presenting results of survey data of over 370 underrepresented minority students reflecting that the “majority of underrepresented students of color do report increased racial understanding in a diverse classroom.” The author observes that achieving
critical mass in affirmative action based institutions creates the opportunity for diversity and decreases racial stigma; however she
notes in order to facilitate “functional diversity” institutions must adopt a color-conscious approach “to create a kind of racial
understanding that eliminates stigma caused by racial stereotyping.”).
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action, including this essayist, must remember that the fact that we have navigated the
playing field with some degree of success does not mean that the landscape is level or
fair.143 As we work to expose, dismantle and disrupt racial discrimination, we must take
affirmative action and use our positions of privilege to expand and increase access to
opportunities for those in our communities who fall within judicial, legislative and
societal blind spots.

The exigency of the need and our individual capacity to operate

effectively in ways that mitigate the harm resulting from pervasive color blindness should
not be underestimated.144 As the late, great Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. reminds
us, “there is no more time for foolishness.”145
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(1986) (“The advancement registered by members of the black middle class is not necessarily evidence that old-fashioned
discrimination has been eradicated. Often, this advancement proceeds despite the presence of continuing prejudice and is made
possible precisely because of the lift provided by affirmative action.”).
144
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